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Schram: Municipal Ordinance Violations in Florida: Selected Due Process C

NOTES

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS IN FLORIDA:
SELECTED DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS*
Municipal ordinances proscribe diverse conduct ranging in seriousness
2
from smoking on a public bus' to the commission of any misdemeanor.
Despite the degree of seriousness involved, all municipal ordinance prosecutions are accorded the same standard of due process. "By the simple expedient
of calling municipal infractions 'offenses' rather than 'crimes,' even though
both are identical in that they are punishable breaches of governmentally
imposed rules of conduct," the accused may be summarily denied due process
guarantees of the United States Constitution. 3 Moreover, state constitutional
and statutory provisions for due process are not applicable to municipal
prosecutions 4 because municipal ordinance violations, even when directly
copied from a state criminal statute,5 are considered offenses against the
municipality rather than against the state. 6 This note will examine the nature
of municipal ordinances in Florida, the application of selected due process
standards in the prosecution of such ordinances, and the need for judicial
and legislative reforms.
THE NATURE OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES IN FLORIDA

Under the Florida constitution 7 the legislature has the sole authority to
create and abolish municipalities within the state." Municipalities are instrumentalities of the state established for the convenient administration of local
government. 9 Unlike counties, municipalities have not been regarded as
* This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize as the outstanding student note submitted during the Winter 1970 Quarter.
1. See, e.g., FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE §28-46 (1969), which provides that it is unlawful to spit or smoke in a public bus. Although no penalties are specified, §1-6 of the
Code provides a maximum fine of $500 or 90 days' imprisonment or both when no penalty
is provided in the Code or in any ordinance.
2. [1959-1960] FLA. Ai-r'y GEN. BIENNIAL Ra'. 76 provides that the Florida Statutes,
§165.19, give municipal governments authority to create by ordinance an offense against
the city out of the same acts that constitute a state offense. See, e.g., FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA.,
CODE §28-48 (1969), which makes the commission of any state misdemeanor within its
corporate limits an offense against the city. See text accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
3. Fogle, Municipal Court Practice,6 U. FLA. L. REV. 399, 401 (1953).
4. Wright v. Worth, 83 Fla. 204, 91 So. 87 (1922).
5. [1959-1960] FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL Rio. 76. No evidence appears contrary to this
position.
6. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1968). But see notes 104-109
infra and accompanying text.
7. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §2a (1968); FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §8 (1885).
8. Treadwell v. Town of Oak Hill, 175 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1965).
9. Broughton v. City of Pensacola, 93 U.S. 266 (1876); Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543
(Fla. 1950).
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subdivisions that share in the state's sovereignty. 10 Prior to the adoption of
the 1968 constitution, municipalities could exercise only powers expressly
provided by the legislature or necessarily incident to such express powers.1 '
Although the "home rule" provisions of the 1968 constitution 2 enable municipalities to enact ordinances of local concern without legislative authorization,
the legislature seemingly can preempt municipal ordinances with special
legislation.13 As a consequence of the legislature's assumed preeminence,
Florida's municipalities continue to exercise only those powers provided by
the legislature.
The legislature authorizes the enactment of ordinances in two ways. A
general statute empowers all municipalities to enact ordinances for the preservation of the public peace, morals, and order of the city. 4 In addition,
special legislation often authorizes municipalities to enact certain additional
ordinances.' 5 Included in the latter category are city charters that often
authorize specific municipal legislation in special areas not mentioned in the
general statute.' 6
The status of municipal ordinance violations in Florida is unclear. 7

10. State v. City of Auburndale, 85 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1956); City of Miami v. Rosen, 151
Fla. 677, 10 So. 2d 307 (1942); City of Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
But see Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
11. State v. City of Auburndale, 85 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1956); Meredith v. Borman, 138 Fla.
149, 189 So. 669 (1939).
12. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §2b (1968).
13. Florida appears to have provided for a unique combination of constitutional and
legislative home rule. The constitutional home rule theory enables municipalities to enact
any ordinance that is not in conflict with general legislation. Legislative home rule contemplates general and special legislation authorizing municipal enactment of ordinances. The
latter was in effect in Florida prior to the 1968 constitution. Section 2(b) of article 8 of
the new constitution, however, provides that municipalities may enact any ordinance
that does not conflict with "law." The legislature, in Fla. Laws 1969, No. 69-33, has in-

terpreted this to include general or special laws. Thus, Florida's municipalities can be
said to have constitutional home rule at legislative sufferance because the legislature can

apparently pass special laws to preempt municipal ordinances.
14. "The city or town council may pass all such ordinances and laws as may be expedient and necessary for the preservation of the public peace and morals, for the suppression of riots and disorderly assemblies and for the order and government of the city

or town, and to impose such pains, penalties and forfeitures as may be needed to carry
the same into effect. Provided, that such ordinances shall not be inconsistent with the
constitution and laws of the United States or of this State; and provided, further, that
for no one offense made punishable by the ordinances and laws of said city or town
shall a fine of more than five hundred dollars be assessed, nor imprisonment for a period
of time greater than sixty days." FLA. STAT. §165.19 (1967).
15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§176.22, 239.55 (1967); Note, Criminal Laws of Administrative
Agencies and Political Subdivisions, 14 U. FLA. L. RPv. 294 (1961).
16. See, e.g., FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE §1-6 (1969), which provides a maximum $500
fine or 90 days imprisonment or both for municipal ordinance violations. FLA. STAT. § 165.19

(1967) provides a maximum fine of $500 and 60 days. The charter, as special legislation,
overrides the general statute in authorizing more severe penalties. Sullivan v. City of Tampa,
101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211 (1931).
17.

See, e.g., FLORIDA ANNOTATIONS TO CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1969 ed. 1968).
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8
and
Although legislation distinguishes "felonies" from "misdemeanors"'
has
never
legislature
the
Florida
with
"crimes,""'
equates "misdemeanors"
defined a "municipal ordinance violation." Ordinance violations might arguably be classified as crimes in cases where special legislation authorizes a
municipality to enact regulatory ordinances and provides that violations of
such ordinances are misdemeanors. 2 0 Since the Florida Statutes provide that
"the word 'crimes' shall include all misdemeanors, "21 at least some ordinances
should be regarded as criminal in character. Nonetheless, violators of these
ordinances apparently do not qualify for due process guarantees accorded to
state prosecutions 22 because the offenses are punished by the municipality
2 3
rather than by the state..
Municipal ordinances enacted under general statutes or chartering legislation pose even more perplexing questions. A general statute ' authorizes
imprisonment for a period of up to sixty days for ordinance violations, and
city charters often extend this limit to ninety days.2 5 Moreover, the language
contained in municipal ordinances themselves often indicates that they are
intended as criminal rather than civil laws.2 6 Similar indications can be found
in the language of state statutes such as Florida's new "stop and frisk" law,
which refers to "a violation of the criminal laws of this State, or the criminal
ordinances of any municipality."27 Other language, however, contradicts this
assumption. The new constitution, for example, provides that the right to
release on reasonable bail must be afforded to "every person charged with

This source, a popular bar review course in Florida, clearly states: "Municipal ordinance
violations which are subject to punishment are crimes in Florida .... ." (Emphasis added.)
But see 23 FLA. JUR. Municipal Corporations §110 (1959): "Although the punishment of
offenses against municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions as contemplated by the
constitutional provision relating to the rights of accused in criminal prosecutions, they
partake more of the nature of criminal than of civil proceedings." (Emphasis added).
See generally W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, CRIMES §79 (5th ed. 1952). "A crime is any act or

omission prohibited by public law for the protection of the public, and made punishable
by the state in a judicial proceeding in its own name. It is a public wrong, as distinguished
from a mere private wrong or civil injury to an individual."
18.
19.
20.
21.

FLA.
FLA.
FLA.
FLA.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§775.08 (1967).
§775.05 (1967).
§§176.22, 239.55 (1967); Note, note 15 supra.
§775.05 (1967).

22. No evidence appears to the contrary. Because they are prosecuted by the municipality, the origin of these "misdemeanors" is not considered.
23. FLA. STAT. §§176.22, 239.55 (1967); Note, note 15 supra.
24. FLA. STAT. §165.19 (1967).
25. FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE §1-6 (1969) provides a maximum $500 fine or 90 days
imprisonment or both for municipal ordinance violations. FLA. STAT. §165.19 (1967) provides

a maximum fine of $500 and 60 days. Thus, the charter, as special legislation, overrides the
general statute in authorizing more severe penalties. Some municipalities punish ordinance
violations by a maximum of 6 months imprisonment and $500 fine. See, e.g., TAMPA, FLA.,
CODE §1-6 (1969).

26. See, e.g., TAMPA, FLA. CODE (1969), which classifies more than 100 ordinances as
"penal offenses."
27. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-73 (emphasis added).
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a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance." 28 The distinction
between crimes and ordinance violations clearly implies that the two are not
synonymous.
Judicial decisions indicate a long standing presupposition that ordinance
violations are not crimes. The Florida supreme court held in Roe v. State
that "no offense is a crime ... which does not violate the law of the land;
and it is well established that a conviction for a violation of a municipal
ordinance does not come within this category." 29 Similarly, in Wilson v.
Quigg3? and Wright v. Worth,31 the court indicated that violations of municipal ordinances are not crimes with reference to statutory and constitutional
provisions for due process in state criminal prosecutions.
At most, the violation of a municipal ordinance appears to be quasicriminal in nature, 32 even though these offenses are punishable by fine or
imprisonment. 33 Where multiple offenses are prosecuted in a single action,
consecutive sentences can easily result in penalties exceeding those for a felony
conviction. 34 Although municipal prosecutions are indistinguishable from
state criminal actions in terms of penal sanctions, municipal offenses have
consistently been regarded as noncriminal with respect to constitutional provisions relating to the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions.3 5 An
examination of some of the areas where due process is denied in municipal
prosecutions may indicate the gravity of this injustice and the need for
corrective measures.
JuRY TRIALS

The Florida constitution guarantees the right of trial by jury;36 however,
this right is limited to criminal prosecutions.3 7 Whether the violation of a
municipal ordinance constitutes a criminal offense thus becomes an important
matter. As early as 1894 the Florida supreme court held in two separate
opinions that there is no inherent right to a jury trial for the violation of a
28.
29.

FLA. CONsT. art. I, §14 (1968) (emphasis added).
96 Fla. 723, 731, 119 So. 118, 121 (1928). However, in Roe the issue on appeal was

whether -a conviction for a municipal offense would affect the credibility of the violator as
a witness in a subsequent judicial proceeding. Thus, the court's holding could be construed
as limited to a determination that ordinance violations are noncriminal in character only as
they relate to the statute that was interpreted.
30. 154 Fla. 348, 354, 17 So. 2d 697, 700 (1944).
31. 83 Na. 204, 210, 91 So. 87, 89 (1922).
32. City of Miami v. Gilbert, 102 So. 2d 818, 819 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
33.

See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.

34. See, e.g., James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969). The defendant was originally sentenced by a municipal court to 600 days imprisonment for petty larceny, resisting
arrest, and three counts of assault and battery upon an officer.
35. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689 (Na. 1968); Boyd v. County of Dade,
123 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1960); Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fa. 348, 17 So. 2d 697 (1944); Wright v.
Worth, 83 Na. 204, 91 So. 87 (1922); City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 114 So. 2d 316 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1959); City of Miami v. Gilbert, 102 So. 2d 818 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
36. FLA. CONsT. art. I §16 (1968); FLA. CONST. Deci. of Rights §11 (1885).
37. FLA. CONSr. art I, §16 (1968). But see FLA. CONST. art. I, §22 (1968).
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municipal ordinance2 s However, rather than distinguishing municipal offenses as noncriminal and, therefore, not subject to the constitutional guar39
antee, the court stated:
[T]he reason advanced as to why the trials under such ordinances
can be conducted without a jury, and without violating the constitutional guaranty is, that the constitutional provision does not extend
the right, but merely secures it in the cases in which it was [a] matter
of right before the adoption of the Constitution. Such trials were
conducted generally without juries prior to the adoption of our Constitution and, consequently, do not fall within the constitutional
guaranty.
In Sellars v. Parker40 the defendant contended that because the violation
of a municipal ordinance is not a crime and section 19 of Florida's Declaration of Rights prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude "except as a punishment for crimes,"41 penal sanctions could not be utilized to punish municipal ordinance violations. After forthrightly conceding that municipal ordinance violations are not crimes, 42 the court was then faced with
justifying imprisonment for the violation of a municipal ordinance. The
court denied that, historically, imprisonment could only be imposed for
nonpayment of a duly imposed fine, and declared that: "[W]here expressly
authorized by statute, imprisonment may be imposed in the first instance for
violation of municipal ordinances that are public in their nature and related
to matters within proper municipal authority."4

3

The logic of Sellars appears

questionable. XVhile stating that violations of municipal ordinances are not
crimes, which require jury trials, the court insisted that imprisonment may
be imposed despite the constitutional prohibition of section 19 of the
Declaration of Rights.
The Florida supreme court, in Boyd v. County of Dade,'4 relied upon
Sellars and, in addition, incorporated part of a New Jersey opinion, which
stated:45

[T]he real underlying historically established test depends upon the
character of the offense involved rather than upon the penalty imposed
... the convenience and benefit to the public resulting from a prompt
and inexpensive trial and punishment of violation of petty and trivial
police power regulations are more important that the comparatively
small prejudice to the individual ....

38. Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 506, 16 So. 398, 399 (1894). Theisen v.
McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 443, 16 So. 321, 322 (1894).
39. Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 507, 16 So. 398, 399 (1894).
40. 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924).
41. FLA. CONST. DecI. of Rights §19 (1885).
42. Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924).
43. Id. at 262.
44. 123 So. 2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1960).
45. Katz v. Eldredge, 97 N.J.L. 123, 150, 117 A. 841, 852 (1922). This rationale, however,
is contrary to recent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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In City of Ft. Lauderdale v. King,48 the court reaffirmed Sellars and
rejected the contention that Florida was treating municipal offenses as
criminal prosecutions while not providing criminal due process guarantees:4 7
It is plain from the context of the constitutional language, stating
imprisonment or involuntary servitude shall be imposed only for
"punishment of crime," that the reference is to crime in its generic
sense, and that as recognized repeatedly by courts faced with such
constitutional problems, construction in the light of history must of
necessity play its part in eliminating the tyranny of words.
The court in Hilliard v. City of Gainesvilleas reiterated its position that
the right of trial by jury does not extend to violations of municipal ordinances
because no such right existed prior to adoption of the constitution. The
opinion cited two recent Supreme Court opinions, Cheff v. Schnackenberg49
and Duncan v. Louisiana.5 0 Cheff held that a jury trial is not required for
"petty offenses" that according to the common law may be proceeded against
summarily,51 but that sentences exceeding six months may not be imposed
by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof. 52 In Duncan the
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment made the right to jury
trial applicable to the states.53 Although the possible sentence in Duncan
was two years' imprisonment, the Court chose to establish the line of demarcation at "serious offenses. 54
Accordingly, the Florida supreme court in Hilliarddeclared that since the
maximum penalty for violations of municipal ordinances is "well below the
'petty offense' maximum," these offenses do not carry a right to a jury trial. 55
Similarly, in City of Ft. Lauderdale v. King,56 the Florida supreme court
relied upon Duncan in concluding that "petty offenses are in fact crimes but
7
may not, on the basis of historical considerations, require jury trials." 5
Concurring specially in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Ervin stipulated
that he concurred "because the municipal sentence imposed here was for five
days' imprisonment only and should not be considered sufficient to bring the
case into the serious crime category."58s Chief Justice Ervin noted, however,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

222 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969).
Id. at 8.
213 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 1968).
384 U.S. 873 (1966).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966).

52.

Id. at 380.

53. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). "Because we believe
jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth
guarantee."
54. Id. at 159.
55. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 1968).
56. 222 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969).
57. Id. at 8.

that trial by
we hold that
cases which Amendment's

58. Id. at 9.
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that in certain instances, when municipal offenses do fulfill the characteristics
of serious crimes, "appropriate safeguards guaranteed by the Federal and State
Constitutions should be honored." 59 He suggested an imprisonment standard
of thirty days or more, concluding that such a rule would be practical and
would satisfy most constitutional guarantees.60
Chief Justice Ervin recently dissented from the majority opinion in Smith
v. Davis,61 and insisted that driving while intoxicated is an offense serious
enough to invoke the constitutional right to trial by jury regardless of
whether the prosecution is based upon a municipal ordinance or state statute.
62
The majority adopted the dissenting opinion of the district court of appeal,
holding that the statute entitling persons charged with driving while intoxicated to a jury trial applies only to state prosecutions.
Notwithstanding indications of dissatisfaction in recent opinions, currently no right to a jury trial exists in Florida municipal prosecutions. A
Senate Joint Resolution, however, has proposed a revision of article V of
the Florida constitution relating to the judicial branch of the government. 3
Section 21 of the proposal would permit municipal prosecutions for violations
of ordinances that are also violations of state law to be transferred to an
appropriate court in which a trial by jury may be secured.64 A senate bill
establishing the requisite procedure to effectuate such transfers has also been
introduced.65 This procedure would become effective upon voter approval
of the Senate Joint Resolution in the November 1970 general election.6"
However, even if these proposals are effectuated, the right to trial by jury will
exist only in instances where the municipal violation also constitutes a violation of state law.67 Thus, serious municipal prosecutions without a right to a
jury trial would continue.
RiIGHT TO COUNSEL

The right to counsel, guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions,Gs has been widely extended by several recent Supreme Court decisions.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61. 231 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1970).
62. Davis v. Smith, 227 So. 2d 342 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969). This case involved FLA. STAT.
§322.262 (4) (1967), which provides a right to jury trial for "any person charged with
driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." Because this right existed on the
state level prior to the statutory enactment, Justice Ervin and the majority in the district
court of appeal argued that the legislature must have intended the statute to apply to
municipal prosecutions.
63. Fla. S.J. Res. 36 (1969).
64.

Id. §21.

65. Fla. S. 288 (1970).
66. The Florida Senate bill, providing procedures to effectuate §21 of S.J. Res. 36,
can become law only if the joint resolution is ratified by Florida voters.
67. This condition would exist primarily in instances where a municipality declared
that the commission of any state misdemeanor within its city limits is also a violation of
municipal law. See note 100 infra and accompanying text.
68. U. S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. CONsT. art. 1, §16
Rights §I1 (1885).
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Beginning with the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright,69 the Court
established the right to counsel as fundamental and essential to due process.
When read narrowly, however, Gideon specifically guarantees counsel only in
state felony prosecutions.-0 Subsequent federal court cases have consistently
extended the Gideon doctrine to require appointment of counsel for indigent
misdemeanants in state courts.7 1 Although the majority of states have refused
to follow the federal courts in this regard, eventual adherence to the federal
72
standard is likely.
The position of Florida courts in this area is illustrated by Watkins v.
Morris,73 in which the Florida supreme court held "there is no absolute
organic right to counsel in misdemeanor trials." 74 Although no Florida case
is on point,75 probably a right to counsel in municipal prosecutions similarly
does not exist. Assuming, however, that Florida will in the future recognize
the right to counsel in misdemeanor trials, what will be the rights of the
defendant in a municipal prosecution?
Except as noted previously7 6 Florida courts do not consider the violation
of a municipal ordinance a misdemeanor. Thus, even if the right to counsel
were guaranteed in state misdemeanor trials, a similar result would not
necessarily follow for municipal ordinance prosecutions. In Brinson v.
Purdy, 7 however, a federal district court sitting in Florida ruled that "the
right to assistance of counsel is determined by the seriousness of the offense,
measured by the gravity of the penalty to which the defendant is exposed
on any given violation."78 Holding as immaterial that the offense charged
was a violation of the Metropolitan Dade County Code, and therefore not a
69. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
70. See generally Comment, Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel: Imprisonment Standard,
21 U. FLA. L. Ray. 421 (1969).
71. See e.g., James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1969); Boyer v. City of Orlando,
402 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1968); McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v.
Mississippi, 840 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1965); Wooley v. City of Jacksonville, 808 F. Supp. 1194
(M.D. Fla. 1970).
72. See Comment, supra note 70, at 422. A federal court sitting in Florida recently
enjoined Volusia County's justice of the peace courts from failing to effectuate the sixth
amendment right to counsel in all misdemeanor prosecutions. Bramlett v. Peterson, 807 F.
Supp. 1811 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
73. 179 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1965).
74. Id. at 849.
75. But see State v. Warden of Orange County Prison Farm, 193 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1967).
In a per curiam opinion the Florida supreme court discharged the writ of habeas corpus
previously granted an indigent serving a 360-day sentence for violation of two municipal
ordinances. Justice Ervin dissented, recommending application of the Gideon principle to
all prosecutions with a potential sentence of 80 days or more.
76. See text accompanying note 20 supra. The Florida supreme court has stated
that "offenses against municipal ordinances providing penalties for certain acts in
violation thereof are neither crimes nor misdemeanors." Roe v. State, 96 Fla. 728,
731, 119 So. 118, 121 (1928). See Boyer v. City of Orlando, 282 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1970).
"The proposition of law actually before us concerns violation of a municipal ordinance,
an offense distinguishable from commission of a misdemeanor ......
77. 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
78. Id. at 843.
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felony, the court recognized that when a man may spend a year in jail for an
offense, he is entitled to assistance of counsel "regardless of whether the offense
be labeled a felony or a misdemeanor."7 9 Noting the definitional problem
that exists from state to state, the court chose to draw the line at the "serious
offense" or "significant penalty" category. 80 Since violations of county ordinances prosecuted in the Dade court are closely analogous to municipal
ordinance violations,"' the court may have also, in effect, prescribed the right
82
to counsel for "serious" municipal ordinance violations.
A recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit also strongly implied that the right to assistance of counsel should
be granted in municipal prosecutions where the possible penalties include
imprisonment. 3 The defendant had been sentenced to a fine of 240 dollars
or 120 days in jail for disorderly conduct and resisting a police officer. In
dismissing the habeas corpus petition based on the failure to appoint counsel,
the court rejected the defendant's contention that the Florida supreme court
would not grant the right to counsel to misdemeanants and ruled that he
4
had failed to exhaust his state remedies.
5
In James v. Headley- the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recommended a dual guideline for appointing counsel to indigents,
stating that "regardless of labels, an offense is serious enough to require
appointment of counsel if it may result in the loss of liberty for any period
of time."86 In addition, the court stipulated that counsel should be required
for any offense involving "moral turpitude," even when no imprisonment
is involved.87 Of great importance in James is the court's requirement that,
notwithstanding the above recommendations, the penalties for multiple
79. Id.
80. Id. at 846.
81. Boyd v. County of Dade, 123 So. 2d 323, 326 (Fla. 1960). But see County of Dade
v. Saffan, 173 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. 1965).
82. Brinson v. Purdy, 273 F. Supp. 840, 845 (S.D. Fla. 1967). The court specifically
refused to extend Gideon to all misdemeanors, claiming that "such a construction could
lead to the appointment of counsel for misdemeanors not normally considered criminal,
such as overparking and other petty traffic offenses, jaywalking, dropping trash upon the
sidewalk, and like offenses."
83. Boyer v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1968).
84. Id. at 967. The court stated: "Considering the deference and respect the Florida
Supreme Court pays to our decisions in areas of federal, and especially federal constitutional law, we cannot assume that Florida Courts would ignore the impact of our recent
decisions." The Florida supreme court recently heard the case and remanded it without
reaching the merits. Boyer v. City of Orlando, 232 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1970). At least one
federal district court sitting in Florida, citing Boyer, does not require exhaustion of state
remedies as a prerequisite to accepting jurisdiction in right to counsel cases. AVooley v. City
of Jacksonville, 308 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
85. 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
86. Id. at 334. This, however, was not the court's holding. Although it appears in
the unanimous opinion, apparently it represents the view of only the author of the
decision. Id. at 327.
87. Id. at 327. The court quoted from the ABA Project on Minimum Standards:
"[P]roviding counsel to those unable to retain their own is essential to the development
of that respect [for the law and its processes]." Id. at 335.
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offenses be joined in determining whether the Supreme Court's "petty offense"
standard of six months imprisonment has been met.88 Thus, although the
defendant here was subject to only sixty days imprisonment for each offense,
she was entitled to counsel when charged with five such offenses.8 9
Although the Supreme Court has failed to specifically guarantee the right
to counsel in all misdemeanor or municipal offense prosecutions, In re Gault9°
offers considerable support for such a position. In Gault the Court held that,
even though juvenile delinquency hearings are termed noncriminal, they
must satisfy the basic essentials of due process and fair treatment.91 When
the proceeding may result in commitment, the child and his parents must be
informed of their right to counsel; and if indigent, counsel must be appointed. 2 By analogy, this holding may apply also to municipal ordinance
violations. When a defendant in a municipal ordinance prosecution is subject
to both fine and imprisonment, classifying the offense as noncriminal should
not enable the state to deny constitutional standards of due process. Justice
Black's concurring opinion in Gault seemed to recognize the basic injustice
in classification practices that serve in part "to prevent the full application to
93
juvenile court cases of the Bill of Rights safeguards." *
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The Florida constitution declares that no person shall be "twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense." 94 While the constitution does not specifically
limit this guarantee to criminal prosecutions, 95 it is well settled that a civil
proceeding does not constitute jeopardy sufficient to bar a subsequent criminal
88. Id. at 327. The opinion also distinguishes between the right to counsel and the
right to a jury trial. "We conclude, therefore, that the petty offense exception to the right
to trial by jury does not require the imposition of a co-extensive exception to the right
to appointed counsel." "It is conceivable that a fair trial may be had before an impartial
judge without a jury, but it is hardly conceivable that a person ignorant in the field of law
can adequately defend himself without the assistance of counsel." Id. at 333.
89. Id. at 329. Accord, Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969) (two offenses
punishable by 90 days and $750); Colon v. Hendry, 408 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969) (sentence
totaling 15 months or $850 for three misdemeanors). In Wooley v. City of Jacksonville, 308
F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Fla. 1970), the court stated that recent Fifth Circuit opinions "establish
the principle that the right to counsel exists where the total potential penalty which
may be imposed on an alleged violator as a result of all pending charges is 90 days or a
$500 fine."
90. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 41.
93. Id. at 59.
*EDrroR's NOTE: In State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, No. 39,309 (Fla. June 3, 1970), the
Florida supreme court extended the right to counsel to "misdemeanors" carrying a possible
penalty of more than six months imprisonment.
94. FLA. CONsr. art. 1, §9 (1968); FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §12 (1885). See generally
Haddad & Mulock, Double Jeopardy Problems in the Definition of the Same Offense: State
Discretion To Invoke the Criminal Process Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. Rav. 515, 524 (1970).
95. In each constitutional provision the only reference to criminal prosecutions is in
relation to the privilege against self-incrimination. FLA. CONST. art. I, §9 (1968); FLA.
CONsT. Ded. of Rights §12 (1885).
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Municipal ordinance prosecutions, falling

between civil and criminal actions, present a difficult question concerning the
applicability of protections against double jeoardy. When initially faced with
this question, the Florida supreme court declared that municipalities are
distinct political bodies from the state and the same act may be a violation
of the laws of both governments. 97 Thus, a conviction or acquittal by the
municipal courts under a municipal ordinance is not a bar to a prosecution
under the state law.98 A municipality may punish by ordinances the same
acts that violate state laws. 99 In fact, it is common practice for municipalities
to incorporate by reference all the state misdemeanors into the municipal
code.100 Thus, if a state misdemeanor were committed in such a city, the
offender would automatically be liable to dual prosecution for a single act.
Although preferably the violator should be prosecuted only under the statutory violation, no legal mandate requires this, and he may be prosecuted
twice. 1° 1 By maintaining that the two offenses are "distinct and separate,"'10 2
even though they in fact stem from a single act, the Florida courts have consistently held that the double jeopardy prohibition is not violated by the dual
prosecution under a municipal ordinance and state statute.10 3
o
In Waller v. Florida,1
4 however, the Supreme Court recently invalidated
Florida's "dual sovereignty" theory by clearly holding that municipal and
state courts, created under the same constitutional provisions, are arms of the
same sovereign. 10s Utilizing Benton v. Ma ryland,10 6 in which the Court made

96. Note, Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy in Florida,2 U. FLA. L. REv. 250, 251 (1949).
97. Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321, 322 (1894). This case, as other Florida
decisions, adheres to the dual sovereignty theory, which permits prosecution by both the
state and municipality because the single act of the defendant violates the laws of both
sovereigns. An alternate theory, not utilized in Florida, holds that because a municipal
prosecution is civil in nature, it does not bar a later state criminal prosecution.
98. Bueno v. State, 40 Fla. 160, 165, 23 So. 862, 863 (1898); Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 507, 16 So. 398, 399 (1894); Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 443, 16
So. 321, 322 (1894).
99. Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fla. 348, 353, 17 So. 2d 697, 700 (1944); [1959-1960] FLA. Arr'Y
GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 76.
100. See, e.g., FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE §28-48 (1969). "It shall be unlawful for any
person to commit, within the corporate limits of the city, any act which is or shall be
recognized by the laws of the state as a misdemeanor, and the commission of such acts is
hereby forbidden."
101. [1965-1966] FLA. A'rr'v GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 37; Note, Criminal Laws of Administrative Agencies and Political Subdivisions, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 294, 298 (1961).
102. See, e.g., Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fla. 348, 353, 17 So. 2d 697, 700 (1944).
103. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1968).
104. 397 U.S. 387 (1970). The Court recognized that, in addition to Florida, the following states were treating municipalities as separate sovereign entities for double jeopardy
purposes: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City
and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. REV. 281 (1964); Note, Constitutional Law: Successive Municipal and State Prosecutions Found Permissible Despite Assumed Application of Double Jeopardy Clause, 1968 DUKE L.J. 362 (1968).
105. The state of Florida argued that the "'dual sovereignty" theory was applicable in
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the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment binding upon the
states through the fourteenth amendment, the Court in Waller held that dual
prosecution by the state and a municipality for the same offense constitutes
double jeopardy.
Despite the holding in Waller, however, all dual municipal-state prosecutions will not constitute double jeopardy. The Waller opinion limited the
holding to instances where a state and a municipality each prosecute for an
identical offense. While this will prevent dual prosecutions in circumstances
where a municipality has incorporated state misdemeanors into its ordinances, 0 7 Waller clearly does not proscribe dual prosecutions for different
offenses arising from the same act. Thus, the state and a municipality may
still prosecute for different "offenses," even when such "offenses" in fact stem
from the accused's single act.10 8 In addition, dual municipal-state prosecutions might conceivably be rationalized by holding that the municipal
prosecution is civil in nature and, therefore, does not act to bar a subsequent
state criminal prosecution. 109

the same manner as to federal-state prosecutions. The Court, however, recognized that
the relationship between the government of a territory and the government of the
United States provides a doser analogy. Two arms of the same sovereign are prohibited
from punishing for a single offense. People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937);
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
106. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The Court had also previously held, in another context,
that "[p]olitical subdivisions of States -counties, cities, or whatever- never were and
never have been considered as sovereign entities." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575
(1964).
107. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
108. Apparently, this would be possible only where the first prosecution resulted in a
conviction or dealt with a determination of ultimate fact different from that to be determined in the subsequent prosecution. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). In
Ashe, the Supreme Court held that the federal doctrine of "collateral estoppel" is embodied in the fifth amendment and, therefore, is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Thus, an initial determination of ultimate fact in a municipal prosecation would bar a future adverse determination of the same issue in a state court.
Vhere a single act constitutes two (or more) offenses, Ashe bars subsequent prosecutions only when the initial prosecution adversely determined ultimate facts that are necessary for a conviction of the second offense. For example, an initial determination that the
accused did not, in fact, commit an alleged act would bar subsequent prosecutions for
other offenses based upon the same alleged act. However, if the initial prosecution only
determined that the act did not constitute the offense charged, a later prosecution (if it
did not involve a lesser included offense) could establish that the accused's act violated
another law.
In effect, therefore, it is clear that neither Ashe nor Waller effectively prevent dual
convictions based upon a single act of the accused. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)
(concurring opinion of Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, J.J.) in which it is strongly urged
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment should bar all subsequent prosecutions stemming from "a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." Id. at
453. This contention has been argued previously. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150, 164
(1959) (Black & Brennan, JJ., dissenting opinions); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187,
201 (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
109. A number of states have utilized such a theory. See Gross, Successive Prosecutions
by City and State - The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. REv. 281 (1964); Note,
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OF DUE PROCESS

A practicing attorney in Florida once wrote that numerous appearances
in municipal courts would dismay anyone who holds dear the ideas of "presumption of innocence" or proof "beyond a reasonable doubt.""n0 Since there
have been no Florida opinions on the quantum of proof necessary to convict
a defendant in a municipal court, no rule of law prevents placing either the
burden of going forward or the burden of proof upon the accused.", Other
areas of due process are similarly not guaranteed by specific rule of law in
the prosecution of municipal offenses. Although all the basic concepts of due
process are guaranteed in the Florida constitution, 112 Florida courts have
hesitated to apply criminal due process standards to municipal trials. Indeed,
the Florida supreme court has held that the language of section 11 of the
Declaration of Rights has no application to the punishment for violations of
municipal ordinances;1 3 and one Florida court has stated that constitutional
safeguards "cannot reasonably be construed to apply to the proceedings of a
municipal court which are quasi-criminal in character."114
However, two due process guarantees have been applied to municipal
ordinance prosecutions. First, the right to bail is specifically guaranteed by
the new constitution to every person charged with violating a municipal
ordinance. 115 The second protection is the right against self-incrimination.
Paradoxically, the constitutional provision that guarantees this right specifically limits it to criminal matters," 6 while the proscription against double
jeopardy contained in the same sentence involves no such limitation."1 The
Florida supreme court, however, has held that the privilege against selfincrimination, while generally not applicable in matters of "civil liability
or mere infamy," does apply to situations involving "forfeiture and penal
liability." ' s A later Florida supreme court case held:" 9
Constitutional Law: Successive Municipal and State Prosecutions Found Permissible Despite
Assumed Application of Double Jeopardy Clause, 1968 DUKE L.J. 362, 367 n.25 (1968).
110. Fogle, Municipal Court Practice, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 399 (1953).
111. Id. at 401. But cf. 13 FLA. JUR. Evidence §434 (1959), which provides that the
former rule was when a criminal act was to be proved in a civil case the quantum of
proof was "beyond a reasonable doubt." This, however, has changed and it is now sufficient
to prove the existence of the criminal act by a preponderance of the evidence.
112. FLA. CONST. art. I, §16 (1968); FLA. CONsr. Decl. of Rights §11 (1885). Section 16
provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and shall be furnished a
copy of the charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to
confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and to have
a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed."
113. Wright v. Worth, 83 Fla. 204, 210, 91 So. 87, 89 (1922).
114. City of Miami v. Gilbert, 102 So. 2d 818, 819 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See City of
St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 114 So. 2d 316 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
115. FLA. CONsT. art. I, §14 (1968).
116. FLA. CONST. art. I, §9 (1968); FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §12 (1885).
117. Id. In each constitutional due process provision the only reference to criminal
prosecutions relates to the privilege against self-incrimination.
118. State v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla. 1954).
119. Boynton v. State, 75 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 1954).
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The protection against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights is applicable to any evidence, documentary or oral, that
tends to convict one of crime or subject him to penalty or forfeiture;
whether the prosecution, penalty or forfeiture involves a civil or
criminal act is not material.
Thus, although neither of these cases involved municipal ordinances, the
language in each is sufficiently clear to extend the privilege against selfincrimination to municipal prosecutions.
THE MERITS OF APPLYING CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
STANDARDS TO MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE PROSECUTIONS

A certain stigma attaches to one accused of committing a crime and, upon
conviction, the label "criminal" is often permanently attached to the individual. Thus, giving up certain constitutional due process guarantees when
charged with a minor traffic violation would seem a small price to pay in
return for escaping the "criminal" label. It is doubtful, however, that this
is the reason municipal ordinance violations are not classified as "crimes."
Even among criminals certain crimes are considered more heinous than others,
and the average man can readily appreciate the difference, for example,
between a conviction for murder and a conviction for manslaughter. Thus,
the seriousness of the offense, rather than its name or category, determines
the relative degree of stigma attached to a conviction. Since severe penalties
may accompany convictions for "serious" municipal offenses, 120 the absence
of due process is an extravagant price for the superficial distinction of classifying these offenses as noncriminal.
The municipal court is often the only contact the average man has with
the American judicial system. More than a minimal attempt at a fair trial is
needed to ensure public confidence in the fairness of criminal justice. Relying
upon the discretion of the court to protect the interests of the accused in these
situations is both impractical and naive.

21

Weighing against the desirability of maintaining full due process standards
in municipal prosecutions is the expense and manpower necessary to apply
these standards and the potential delays these safeguards might cause. Jury
trials are expensive and time-consuming. Appointing counsel for every indigent accused of violating a municipal ordinance may severely burden
municipal finances and the legal profession. 22 However, even if the application of constitutional due process standards to municipal trials must, of
necessity, be somewhat limited, denying their application altogether is also
an unacceptable solution.
120. See, e.g., James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969), where defendant was
sentenced by a municipal court to 600 days imprisonment.
121. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). The Supreme Court rejected the contention
that probation officers and juvenile court judges can effectively represent the child, thereby
making counsel essential in all juvenile cases where the prospect of incarceration is present.
122. See generally Comment, Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel: Imprisonment Standard,
21 U. FLA. L. Rv. 421 (1969).
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APPEALS

Although municipal convictions are appealable, 123 the number of cases
actually reaching the appellate level is surprisingly low. This possibly results
from the de minimis nature of most municipal prosecutions and the high cost
of appeal, coupled with the fact that those who are sentenced to jail are often
indigents who cannot pay their fines. Thus, the problems of due process must
be solved at the trial level or they are not likely to be solved at all.
CONCLUSION

The following recommendations are submitted with regard to due process
guarantees in municipal ordinance prosecutions:
(1) Of foremost importance is the need to ignore labels as the
criterion for applying due process standards. Thus, whether municipal
ordinance violations are classified as criminal or noncriminal, the fact
that a conviction can result in severe penalties should be the relevant
factor in determining the standard of due process to be applied. There is
no logical reason why due process may not be afforded while still retainto lessen
ing the present classification of noncriminal (or quasi-criminal)
24
the stigma associated with municipal court convictions.1
(2) The application of constitutional due process standards should
bear a direct relationship to the seriousness of the offense charged. The
measure of seriousness logically should be the extent of the penalties provided for the offense.
(3) The right to the assistance of counsel and the right to demand a
jury trial should be guaranteed for all offenses where the possibility of protracted imprisonment is present. The recommendation of Chief Justice
Ervin of the Florida supreme court to set the standard at imprisonment
for thirty days or more appears reasonable.125 While any such standard
is at best arbitrary, this standard would guarantee these basic rights when
most needed without placing an unreasonable strain upon either municipal finances or the legal profession.
Such a revision could readily be effectuated by providing for court
123. FLA. CONST. art. V, §6 (1968); FLA. STAT. §932.52 (1967). Section 932.52 provides:
"Any person convicted of any offense in any municipal court in this state may appeal from
the judgment of such court to the circuit court of the county in which the conviction took
place." Paragraph 13 of this section provides: "The circuit court shall have the power to
lower the sentence imposed by the municipal court if in his discretion the same should
be lowered." In addition, the district court of appeal can review the circuit court by
"common law certiorari." See, e.g., Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 164 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1964).
124. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23 (1967). "Further, we are told that one of the
important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the
juvenile as a criminal." Id. at 24: "[I]n practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that
an adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment. There is no reason why the application of due
process requirements should interfere with such provisions."
125. City of Ft. Lauderdale v. King, 222 So. 2d 6, 9 (1969) (concurring specially). In
such event many code penalty provisions would have to be revised to ensure that only the
more serious offenses were punishable by more that 30 days because in providing counsel,
the potential rather than the actual sentence must be considered.
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appointed counsel 126 and broadening section 21 of Senate Joint Resolution 36 to allow transfer of all "serious" municipal prosecutions to courts
where jury trials can be obtained.127 Adherence to such a standard might
be guaranteed through the enactment of a statute prohibiting municipal
court sentences of more than 30 days unless the right to counsel and jury
trial were either utilized or intelligently waived by the defendant. Ideally,
such a statute should apply to all sentencing, whether imposed initially
1 28
or as a result of defendants' inability to pay court imposed fines.
(4) Although the Supreme Court has "pierced the corporate veil"
and thus finally destroyed the myth of "dual sovereignty," dual municipalstate prosecutions may still persist. Florida courts have the judicial
precedent to establish that municipal prosecutions are civil in nature and,
therefore, do not bar subsequent state criminal prosecutions. Because this
theory is illogical and oppressive in light of the penal nature of many
municipal ordinances, it should be repudiated. At the same time, the
noncriminal label of municipal prosecutions should be retained to avoid
the stigma inherent in a criminal conviction.
(5) Recognizing the fact that municipal prosecutions resemble criminal actions more than civil ones, the quantum of proof necessary for a
conviction should be specified in order to ensure that the burden of going
forward as well as the burden of proof are borne by the prosecutor rather
than the defendant. A contrary procedure is "in violation of every
basic
29
precept of Anglo-American legal theory of criminal prosecution."'1
Implementation of these proposals would not critically disrupt the func.
tioning of the municipal courts. In most instances, the current procedures
followed by these courts would remain substantially unchanged if timely
revisions of penal provisions were accomplished. Then, only in serious cases
where a potential of imprisonment for more than thirty days exists would
municipal prosecutions come to resemble state trials. Since the potential punishment in serious municipal prosecutions can equal or exceed that of a
misdemeanor or felony, what logical justification can be given for not applying the same guarantees of due process?
RONALD YOUNG SCHRAM

126. As an alternative, municipal court revenues might permit municipalities to
retain a staff of attorneys to represent all defendants in a manner similar to the representation afforded the municipality by its prosecutor. As to the importance of counsel in
all criminal cases, sce James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969), A quotation from this
decision appears note 88 supra.
127. Problems envisioned with providing jury trials in the municipal courts appear to
make this the only viable alternative. Presently, most municipal courts lack the authority
to provide juries in any circumstance. In addition, potential delays brought about by
jury trials could severely cripple the current operating procedures of municipal courts and
result in prolonged incarceration for those accused of minor offenses.
128. The Fifth Circuit court recently made the following comments in relation to the
right to counsel in ordinance prosecutions: "In computing the total potential penalty which
may be imposed on a defendant, we suggest that the trial court not only consider the
maximum possible sentence and fine under each charge, but also any additional sentence
which may be imposed if the fine is not paid. As our opinions indicate, this procedure
gives a much more accurate representation of the gravity of charges facing a defendant especially an indigent defendant." Matthews v. Florida, 422 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1970).
129. Fogle, supra note 110, at 401.
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